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Note
BURNING TREE CLUB, INC. v. BAINUM-STATE ACTION,
STRICT SCRUTINY, AND THE "NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM"
In the past fifteen years a great deal has been written about the
revitalization of state constitutional law. I This "new judicial federalism" 2 has acquired significance because of the unwillingness of the
United States Supreme Court, in recent years, to expand the scope
of rights available under the federal constitution.' Litigants increasingly have used their state constitutions and courts to obtain greater
protection of their rights.4 Commenting on this turn of events,Justice Brennan recently said that "[r]ediscovery by state supreme
courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by
their state constitutions ... is probably the most important develop-

1. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977); Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond the "New Federalism," 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (Winter 1985); Countryman, The Role of a Bill of
Rights in a Modern Constitution: Why a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REV. 453, 454
(1970); Galie, State ConstitutionalGuarantees and Protection of Defendants' Rights: The Case of
New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 157 (1979); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman &
Wheeler, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961 (1978); Linde, First
Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.-BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Note,
Developments in the Law--The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324 (1982); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Williams, Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: Equality Guarantees in State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1191 (1985).
2. Tarr & Porter, Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate
Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919, 920 (1982).

3. Id. at 925.
4. R. Collins, P. Galie &J.Kincaid, STATE HIGH COURTS, STATE CoNsTrrtrrioNS,
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS LITIGATION SINCE

NAL OF FEDERALISM

1980:

AJUDICIAL SURVEY,

AND

16 PUBLIUS: THEJOUR-

141 (Summer 1986). This litigiousness has led to a debate over what

the appropriate role of state constitutional law is in a federal system. Advocates of the
"primacy" model believe that state constitutional law should develop independently of
federal models and that state constitutional questions should be resolved before federal
constitutional questions are considered. The "interstitial" model sees state constitutional law in the much more limited role of "filling in the spaces left open by federal
constitutional doctrine .... " Note, supra note t, at 1332, 1356. See also Comment, The
Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 319; Deukmejian &
Thompson, All Sail And No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 975, 996-1009 (1979); Linde, supra note 1; Pollock, State Constitutions

as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983).
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ment in constitutional jurisprudence of our times." '
The development of state constitutional law in the area of gender discrimination has been especially pronounced. 6 In the absence
7
of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the federal constitution,
many of the seventeen states which have "little ERAs"' have interpreted their ERAs more broadly than they might have with an ERA
provision in the federal constitution.9
In 1972 the Maryland legislature adopted, and the voters approved, Maryland's ERA, which states: "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."' t The leading
ERA case in Maryland is Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum." In Burning Tree, the court of appeals examined a state statute that denied
preferential tax treatment to country clubs that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin, but which created
an exception for country clubs "operated with the primary purpose
... to serve or benefit members of a particular sex." 2 A majority of
the court of appeals held that the exception, the so-called "primary
purpose" provision violated Maryland's ERA.'" The court, however, also decided that the "primary purpose" provision was not
severable from the broader anti-sex discrimination language of the
5. National Law Journal, Sept. 29, 1986, at S-12 (quoting Aug. 8, 1986 speech.in
New York).
6. See Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 144 (1984); Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State Constitutions,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086 (1977); Tarr & Porter, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 1.
7. The language of the proposed federal amendment was: "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat.. 1523 (1972). The amendment
was adopted by a joint resolution of Congress on March 22, 1972. S.J. Res. 8, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In 1978 Congress extended the time limit for ratification until
June 30, 1982. H.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 126 Cost. REC. 34,281,
34,314-15 (1978).
An identical amendment was introduced in the House on January 3, 1983, but on
November 15, 1983, it failed to achieve the necessary 2/3 majority. See H.R.J. Res. 1,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H46 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1983); H.R.J. 1,98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H9865-66 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1983).
8. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Marvland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. The texts of these states' ERAs (except New Hampshire's)
are collected in Comment, supra note 6 at 1111-12. For New Hampshire's ERA, see
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2.

9. See infra note 83.
10. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.

I1. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
12. M. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(c)(4) (1980).
13. 305 Md. at 80, 501 A.2d at 830.
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statute. 4 Thus, the immediate effect of the decision was to allow
Burning Tree Club (Burning Tree) to continue both excluding women and receiving the preferential tax assessment. Nevertheless,
the significance of the Burning Tree decision lies in its application of
the ERA. It is the court's most recent holding on the ERA, and the
first case in which the court has discussed the "state action" requirement in the ERA context.
Although Maryland often has been grouped with Washington
and Pennsylvania as states, applying an "absolute standard" to sexbased classifications, 15 this note concludes that Maryland wisely
joined the majority of courts in ERA states' 6 by adopting the strict
scrutiny standard. In rejecting the federal courts' "intermediate
standard" of scrutiny' 7 for sex-based classifications and the "absolute standard," Maryland has adopted a relatively clear, workable
test for applying Maryland's ERA.
On the issue of state action, Maryland, like most states, has adhered closely to state action standards borrowed from federal equal
protection analysis.'" This note contends, however, that in ERA
cases the Maryland Court of Appeals should advance the "new judicial federalism" by crafting a state action standard broader than that
used by the federal courts.
Before looking at how the Burning Tree court applied the ERA,
this note will describe the background and current status of the state
action requirement and of the various levels of scrutiny, both in the
federal courts and in Maryland and other state courts at the time of
the Burning Tree decision. It will describe the debates over the state
action and absolute scrutiny issues. Then it will discuss the Burning
Tree decision and what that decision signals for Maryland's future on
these issues. Finally, it will suggest the course the Maryland courts
should follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

State Action

For the most part, the federal constitution limits only governmental conduct and does not proscribe the conduct of private enti14. Id. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832-33.
15. See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
16. For the purposes of this article, "ERA states" refers to those states which have an
ERA provision in their state constitution.
17. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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ties.'" Since 1883 when the Supreme Court held in The Civil Rights
Cases2" that the fourteenth amendment prohibited only "state action" and not the actions of private parties, 2 federal equal protection analysis has required a determination of whether a challenged
activity involves the government sufficiently to qualify as "state action."" 2 The degree of state involvement which should be required
has been a topic of some debate.2 3
Through the 1960s the Supreme Court's view of state action
was sometimes quite broad. In Shelley v. Kraemer,2 4 for example, the
Court held that state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constituted "state action. ' 25 In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority26 the Court held that a restaurant leasing space from a state
government was a state actor for fourteenth amendment
purposes.2 7
In 1972, during the Burger era, the Court began a retrenchment in the "state action" area.28 In Moose Lodge v. Irvis,2 9 the Court
held that a segregated club operating with a state-issued and regulated liquor license was not a state actor for fourteenth amendment
19. But see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (the thirteenth amendment
"is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing.or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States."). See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (the right of
interstate travel is "assertable against private as well as governmental interference"); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665-66 (1884) (citizens had a cause of action under the
Constitution against private individuals who interfered with their exercise of their right
to vote in federal elections).
20. 109 U.S. 3.
21. Id. at 11. One commentator points out that the fourteenth amendment state
action requirement actually was stated prior to The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, in
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 554-55 (1875). Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 507-08
& 508 n.17 (1985).
22. "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 -(1974).

23. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25. Id. at 20.
26. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
27. Id. at 724-25.
28. One commentator writing in 1979 stated, "it is on the topic of state action that
one can find the clearest area of conservatism on the part of the Burger Court and the
most unqualified reversal of position from that adhered to by the Burger Court's predecessor." J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1978-1979, at 265 (1979).
29. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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purposes.3 ' The Court reasoned that since Pennsylvania's liquor licensing scheme was not designed to encourage discrimination, discriminatory clubs that obtain licenses are not state actors. 3 , The
Court also held, however, that a Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
regulation requiring all licensees to adhere to all the provisions of
their constitution and by-laws was impermissible state action when
applied to a club whose constitution or by-laws required racial discrimination. 2 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 3 3 the Court held
that a regulated utility company, with a state-granted partial monopoly, was not a state actor subject to the fourteenth amendment.3 4
In 1982 the Supreme Court's reluctance to find state action
continued. In Blum v. Yaretsky 3 5 the Court held that a nursing
home's transfer of some of its patients was not state action for fourteenth amendment purposes even though the nursing home received Medicaid payments from the state.3 ' The Court reasoned
that state action was not involved because the state was not "responsible for the specific conduct" at issue.3 7 Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, s8 the Court held that a private school, which received ninety
percent of its operating budget from public sources, was not a state
actor when it fired several of its employees.3 9 The Court stated that
"[a]cts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in
performing public contracts." ' 40 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 1
however, the Court found state action present where private creditors invoked a prejudgment attachment statute which required the
participation of state officials.4" Although the Court found state action in Lugar, at least one commentator suggests that in Lugar the
Court actually may be "tightening the state action requirement" by
requiring the plaintiffs to show both "the existence of a relevant
state policy and the involvement of state actors." 43
30. Id. at 171-72.
31. Id. at 176-77.
32. Id. at 178-79.
33. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
34. Id. at 358.
35. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
36. Id. at 1003-05.
37. Id. at 1004 (emphasis in original).
38. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
39. Id. at 841-42.
40. Id.at 841.
41. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
42. Id. at 942.
43. Comment, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, 96

HARV.

L. REV. 1,242-44 (1982).
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A number of commentators have urged that courts should dispense with the "state action" doctrine entirely. 4 They argue that
the state action doctrine is incoherent4 5 and that it is based on an
"anachronistic premise" in which the common law protects individuals from "infringements of their rights by private actors." ' 46 They
reject the view "that state action is needed to protect a zone of pri' 47
vate autonomy and to safeguard state sovereignty.
Proponents of the state action requirement respond by arguing
that a state action ;equirement is inherent in any constitutional provision; 4 8 that state action requirements protect a zone of personal
autonomy; 4 9 that requiring state action helps preserve state autonomy; 50 that "constitutionalizing private law" would hamper legislative and common-law responses to social issues 5' and would
produce disrespect and fear of the Constitution. 2
Like the language of the fourteenth amendment 5 and the language of the unenacted federal ERA,54 some of the state ERAs55
explicitly incorporate a state action requirement. The language of
Maryland's ERA, however, is not as suggestive. It states, "Equality
of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of
sex. "56 Some commentators have suggested that this language does
57
not mandate any state action requirement.
44. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81
L. REV. 69 (1967); Friendly, The Public-PrivatePenumbra-FourteenYears Later, 130
L. REV. 1289 (1982).
45. Black, supra note 44.
46. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 506.
47. Id.
48. See Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and "State Action ":The View of the Framers,
22 WILLAME'rE L. REV. 445, 447 (1986) (suggesting that state action is a "fundamental
premise of a bill of rights").
49. See Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 506.
50. Id.
51. Marshall, Diluting ConstitutionalRights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 558, 566 (1985).
52. Id. at 569-70.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
54. See supra note 7.
55. See, e.g.,
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex."); HAW. CoNsr. art. I,§ 3 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the State on account of sex.").
56. MD. CONsT. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.
57. Comment, The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment: Eight Years of Application, 9 U.
BALr. L. REV. 342, 369 (1980). In Heins, "The Marketplace and the World of Ideas". A
Substitute For State Action As A Limiting Principle Under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 347, 369 (1984), the author argues that identical language in
HARV.
U. PA.
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Of the seventeen states with ERAs, five of them expressly proscribe only state action.5" Of the eleven states besides Maryland
that do not explicitly limit the reach of their ERAs to state action, 59
only five have reached the state action question.6 ° Of those five,
four have ERA language very similar to Maryland's in that they all
mandate equality "under the law." 6 ' The unanimous view of the
courts in all of these states is that their ERAs are only designed to
62
prevent state action.
Some state courts, however, have rejected the federal analysis
in defining the scope of the state action requirement.6" The Pennthe Massachusetts ERA does not require a showing of state action. Heins argues that
analogizing to the "under color of law" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) is inappropriate. She also argues that because five state ERAs and the fourteenth
amendment have "under the law" or "equal protection of the law" as well as an explicit
state action requirement, the "under the law" language by itself does not mandate state
action. Heins, supra, at 370.
58. Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Comment, supra note
6, at 1111-12.
59. Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See id.; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 2.
60. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1111-12.
61. MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. I ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28
("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."); TF.x. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or
national origin. This amendment is self-operative."); WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1
("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex.").
The Connecticut Constitution's language is somewhat different: "No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion,
race, color, ancestry, national origin or sex." CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
62. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs. Inc., 408 So. 2d
711, 715-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm.
Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594, 609 n.9, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1160 n.9 (1984);
Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Pa. Super. 244, 257, 422 A.2d 1097, 1104
(1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n,
576 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am.,
24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1979), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683
(1981).
63. See, e.g., Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 211, 361 N.E.2d 225, 227
(1977) (stating in dicta that the ERA would prohibit a private trust's scholarship fund
being limited to boys); Murphy, 282 Pa. Super. at 257, 422 A.2d at 1104 (holding that
automobile insurance rates which allegedly discriminated against unmarried males
under 30 did not violate the Pennsylvania ERA because setting insurance rates does not
involve state action); Lincoln, 576 S.W,2d at 924 (holding that "the words 'Under the
law' in the [Texas ERA] ... require that the discrimination complained of is state action
or private conduct that is encouraged by, enabled by, or closely interrelated in function
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sylvania Supreme Court, for example, held,
The rationale underlying the "state action" doctrine is irrelevant to the interpretation of the scope of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, a state constitutional
amendment adopted by the Commonwealth as part of its
own inorganic law. The language of that enactment, not a
test used to measure the extent of federal constitutional
protections, is controlling.'
In cases outside of the gender discrimination context, a number
of state courts have expanded the federal courts' conception of state
action, 6 5 particularly in free speech cases. In response to United
States Supreme Court decisions which held that the owners of private shopping malls were not state actors for first amendment purposes and therefore were free to restrict speech in their malls, 66 a
number of state courts ruled that under their state constitutions,
state action is broad enough to include such semi-public places.
The Maryland courts, however, have generally adhered very
closely to the federal model of state action. 68 Hence, the Maryland
with state action"); Junior Football Ass'n of Orange v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that an injunction requiring a football association to allow females to participate must be set aside because evidence of state action was insufficient).
64. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'n of the Commonwealth of
Pa., 505 Pa. 571, 588, 482 A.2d 542, 549 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 474, 595
P.2d 592, 602, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24 (1979) (holding that the equal protection provision
of the California Constitution operates to bar a state-protected public utility from arbitrarily or invidiously discriminating in its employment decisions); Sharrock v. Dell-Buick
Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 163-64, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1176, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 46
(1978) (holding that a lien law involved state action in violation of the due process
clause because it empowered a garageman to conduct an ex parte sale of a bailed
automobile).
66. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
67. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341,
347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (shopping center); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 90 n.9,.445 N.E.2d 590, 594 n.9 (1983)
(shopping center); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 549, 423 A.2d 615, 622 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (college campus); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158,
171-73, 432 A.2d 1382, 1388-90 (1981) (private college); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243-46, 635 P.2d 108, 116-17 (1981) (shopping
center). See also Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J.
165, 168-69 (1980).
68. The following is from the Report of the Constitutional Commission considering
a proposed amendment adding a due process clause to the Maryland Constitution. The
amendment was rejected by the voters:
[T]he Commission's position [is] that the function of a Declaration of Rights is
to state those personal rights which the people want protected from the exercise of the powers of government and that a constitution or Declaration of
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courts have construed the due process 6 9 and just compensation 70
provisions in article 24 of the Maryland Constitution in the same
way the federal courts construe similar provisions in the federal constitution. 7 It is not unprecedented, however, for the Maryland
Court of Appeals to interpret a provision in the state constitution
differently from a similar one in the federal constitution. In Horace
Mann League of the United States v. Board of Public Works, 7 2 for example,
the court held that funding arrangements for schools with religious
affiliations violated the estiblishment clause of the first amendment
to the federal constitution, but did not violate a similar provision of
article 36 of the Maryland Constitution.7 3
Within the context of the Maryland ERA, the "state action"
question did not arise prior to Burning Tree because all the previous
ERA cases involved challenges to statutes where state action was
clearly present.7 4 Nevertheless, the Attorney General of Maryland
has expressed the opinion that the ERA is applicable only against
governmental action.75
B.

Level of Scrutiny

Under the Supreme Court's analysis of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, classifications based on race
Rights should not be used as the means .for protecting the rights of private
persons against the actions of other private persons.
CONSTrrTmONAL CONVENTrION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE CONs-rrrTIroNAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 104 (1967).
69. See, e.g., Department ofTransp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392,415-16,474 A.2d 191,
203 (1984); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056, appeal
dismissed, 449 U.S. 807, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980).
70. See, e.g., King v. State Roads Comm'n of State Highway Admin., 298 Md. 80, 8384, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034 (1983); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 156,
321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974).
71. But see Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d
758, 781 (1983) (the fourteenth amendment and article 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights are "in pari materia and generally apply in like manner and to the same extent;
nevertheless the two provisions are independent of each other so that a violation of one
is not necessarily a violation of the other."). See also 68 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) 173, 178-84
(1983) (suggesting that, even in the fourteenth amendment context, Maryland may be
more willing to find state action than its federal counterparts).
72. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied & appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
73. Id. at 684-90 (holding that the grants did not violate article 36 because the grants
were to higher educational institutions with a religious affiliation and the state has never
attempted to provide universal educational facilities for its citizens at that level).
74. See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 516, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977) (holding that
when the state imposes parental obligations for child support, it is not primarily an obligation of the father, but is one shared by both parents). For a further discussion of
Rand, see infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
75. 65 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) 103 (1980); 63 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) 246, 250 (1978).
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and national origin 76 are subject to strict scrutiny. 77 That is, such
classifications "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . .to the accomplishment' of their
legitimate purpose. ' 78 The Court came close to making sex-based
79
classifications subject to strict scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson,
where a four-member plurality said that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 8 0 A majority of the Court, however, has never held
that sex-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Instead,
the Court has developed an intermediate level of scrutiny: "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'" This is the standard currently applied to sex-based classifications challenged on federal equal protection grounds.8 2
In contrast, most courts in states with ERAs impose strict scru'

76. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944) (holding that excluding
Japanese-Americans from certain areas on the West Coast was not unconstitutional because it could pose a military danger in the war with Japan).
77. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that a Virginia statute preventing interracial marriage violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment).
78. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
79. 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal law permitting
male members of the armed forces to claim their spouses as dependents, but not allowing female members to claim their spouses absent proof of dependency).
80. Id. at 688. Although the Supreme Court's language in Frontieroand its decisions
in older cases such as Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), suggest that alienage is
a suspect class, the Court's 1978 decision in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), has
made the Frontiero plurality's assertion that alienage is a suspect class somewhat less
certain. In Foley the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a law requiring that New
York state troopers be United States citizens. 435 U.S. at 296.
81. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (holding that the policy of the Mississippi University for Women, which limits enrollment to
women, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-76 (1981) (holding that a California statute which
prohibited sexual intercourse with women under age 18, but not with men, did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (holding that a Louisiana statute giving a husband the right to
unilaterally dispose ofjointly owned community property without the spouse's consent
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 283 (1979) (holding that an Alabama statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
Justice Powell, concurring in Frontiero, suggested that the passage of the ERA would
mean the application of strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tiny to sex-based classifications."3 In Massachusetts, for example,
the supreme court stated:
We believe that the application of the strict scrutinycompelling State interest test is required in assessing any
governmental classification based solely on sex.... To use
a standard in applying the Commonwealth's equal rights
amendment which requires any less than the strict scrutiny
test would negate the purpose of the equal rights amendment and the intentiofi of the people in adopting it. 4
Two states, Washington 5 and Pennsylvania,"6 have adopted
the so-called "absolute standard" to sex-based classifications, a
tougher test than even strict scrutiny.8 7 In Pennsylvania, the
83. See, e.g., People v. Green, 183 Colo.25, 28, 514 P.2d 769, 770 (1973) (in dicta the
court noted that sex classifications must receive the "closest" judicial scrutiny); Page v.
Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 258, 270-71, 365 A.2d 1118, 1125 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which provided that a working woman, with children
and a working husband, had a lower exemption for purposes of adjusting welfare payments than a working man with children and a working wife); People v. Ellis, 57 I11.
2d
127, 133, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1974) (holding that an Illinois statute which restricted
prosecution of boys under 18 and girls under 17 violated the equal protection clause
because there was no compelling state interest to justify treating a 17-year-old boy differently than a 17-year-old girl); Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 21, 372 N.E.2d
196, 206 (1977) (in dicta the court noted that sex classifications are subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny); In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987)
(holding that a Texas statute with a gender-based distinction relative to fathers' legitimation of illegitimate children violated the Texas ERA).
Two states appear not to have construed their ERAs at all-Montana and New
Mexico. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1088.
California and North Dakota, although lacking ERAs, have recognized sex as a suspect classification under their equal protection clauses. Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.
3d 1, 22, 485 P.2d 529, 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 343 (1971) (holding that a California
statute barring women from tending bar in certain situations violated the California
Constitution); Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624, 627 (N.D. 1973) (holding that a North
Dakota statute defining adulthood as 18 for males and 21 for females would deny to
males between the ages of 18 and 20 equal protection of the law).
84. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 374 Mass. 836, 839-40,
371 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1977).
85. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975) (holding that a
school district's decision to bar high school girls from playing on their high school football team was unconstitutional). For additional discussion concerning Darin, see infra
notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
86. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 301-03, 328 A.2d 851, 858-59 (1974)
(holding that a Pennsylvania statute prescribing that all men receive minimum sentences
and that all women not be given minimum sentences was unconstitutional).
87. In a less significant variation, a few states have applied a lower level of scrutiny
than that available under the fourteenth amendment analysis. In Archer v. Mayes, 213
Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973), the Virginia Supreme Court applied only a rational
basis test to a statute, challenged under the state ERA, which permitted mothers (but
not fathers) to be excused from jury duty. Id. at 638, 194 S.E. 2d at 711. A rational basis
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supreme court interpreted that state's ERA to mean that
the sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a
permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights
and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a
society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.8 8
In Darrin v. Gould 9 the Washington Supreme Court, noting
that sex-based classifications already were subject to strict scrutiny
under the state's equal protection clause, said that the ERA was "intended to do more than repeat what was already contained in the
otherwise governing constitutional provisions.., by which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship
and strict scrutiny tests." 90 In a later case the court spoke even
more forcefully:
The ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under traditional "strict scrutiny." The ERA... absolutely prohibits the sacrifice of equality for any state
interest, no matter how compelling, though separate equality may be permissible
in some very limited
circumstances. 9 '
While Pennsylvania has adhered rather closely to this standard,9 2 the Washington Supreme Court, despite the sweeping language in Darrin, has issued subsequent rulings which leave the
meaning of the absolute standard unclear in Washington. Since Darrin, the Washington court has upheld an ordinance which made it
"lewd conduct" to expose female breasts in public,9 3 has upheld a
statute requiring that the State Democratic Committee consist of a
test requires only that a classification "bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose." Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,
547 (1983). This variation is considerably less stringent than intermediate scrutiny
under the equal protection standard. See also Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236,
238-39 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding, in a divorce case, the trial court's judgment in
awarding custody of the children to the wife because it was not "unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary"); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994,.996 (Utah 1975) (upholding, in a divorce case, the trial court's judgment in awarding custody of the children to the wife).
88. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
89. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
90. Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889.
91. Southwest Washington Chapter Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County,
100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
92. Comment, Washington's Equal Rights Amendment: It Says What It Means and It .feans
What It Says, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 461, 481-83 (1985).
93. Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 584 P.2d 918, 922 (1978).
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male and female from each county,9 4 and has refused to consider a

claim that a "Ladies Night" offering lower prices to women than
men violated the ERA.9 5 At least one commentator believes that
Washington can no longer be considered an absolute standard
state.96
Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for
Women, a widely cited article by Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk, and Ann E. Freedman (Brown),97 appears to have
been the genesis for the a[solute standard. Brown argued for an
absolute construction of the proposed federal ERA: "[T]he constitutional mandate must be absolute. The issue under the Equal
Rights Amendment cannot be different but equal, reasonable or unreasonable classification, suspect classification, fundamental interest, or the demands of administrative expediency. Equality of rights
means that sex is not a factor." 9
This aversion to applying strict scrutiny is based on a perception that even this standard permits too much discretion and might
allow some classifications to survive. 99 Brown does not specifically
contrast the circumstances surrounding sex-based classifications
with the circumstances surrounding race-based classifications.
Thus, it is unclear whether Brown views strict scrutiny as inadequate
for race-based classifications as well or whether Brown sees strict
scrutiny as more likely to be abused in the area of sex. In any case,
the clear impression given by Brown is that the proposed absolute
94. Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 308, 582 P.2d 487,493 (1978), aff'd, 442
U.S. 191 (1979).
95. MacLean v. First Northwest Indus., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 348, 635 P.2d 683, 688
(1981).
96. See Comment, supra note 92, at 464. That commentator considers Pennsylvania
to be the only state adhering to an absolute standard of review. That author views the
Washington court's decision in Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 308, 582 P.2d at 493, upholding a statute requiring that the two delegates to the State Democratic Committee from
each county be of the opposite sex, as abandoning the absolute standard. Comment,
supra note 92, at 464.
97. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
98. Id. at 892. Further explicating the phrase, "sex is not a permissible factor," the
authors argue "[tihis means that the treatment of any person by the law may not be
based upon the circumstance that such person is of one sex or the other." Id. at 889.
99. [T]he judgment as to whether differential treatment is justified or not
would rest in the hands of the very legislatures and courts which maintain the
existing system of discrimination. The process by which they make that judgment involves the same discretionary weighing of preferences as has resulted in.
the present inequality. This is true whether the standard ofjudging is "reasonable classification," "suspect classification," or "fundamental interest."
Id. at 892.
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standard is a tougher obstacle to overcome than strict scrutiny because some classifications that could survive strict scrutiny could not
pass the absolute standard.
After presenting the basic principle, Brown immediately announces a "subsidiary principle" which states that the ERA "does
not preclude legislation

. . .

which regulates, takes into account, or

otherwise deals with a physical characteristic unique to one sex. ' "1°
In a second caveat, Brown argues that the constitutional right of
privacy would permit a narrow range of sex-segregated practices involving "disrobing, sleeping, or performing personal bodily functions in the presence of the other sex."' 0' Finally, Brown says that
while sex-based classifications designed to benefit women in general
would not be permitted under the absolute standard, affirmative action measures to remedy
past discrimination in particular cases
10 2
would be permissible.

Despite these qualifications, Brown makes it clear that the application of the absolute standard would provide more protection to
equal rights for women than strict scrutiny.' The authors specifically reject any reading of the ERA which would permit separate but
equal arrangements except those covered by the privacy doctrine:
"As to facilities provided or subsidized by the government ...[t]he
separate-but-equal doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the principles and objectives of the Equal Rights Amendment."' 0 4 Brown acknowledges -that' the "subsidiary principle" could be used as a
subterfuge for laws discriminating against one sex, but resolves this
by urging courts to apply strict scrutiny
to laws dealing with physical
05
sex.
one
to
unique
characteristics
Yet, Washington has created considerable confusion in its application of the subsidiary principle. In Seattle v. Buchanan,'"6 for example, the Washington Supreme Court applied this exception and
upheld an ordinance which made it "lewd conduct" to expose female breasts in public.'0 7 The court reasoned that the ordinance
"applies alike to men and women, requiring both to cover those
parts of their body which are intimately associated with the procrea100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 893.
Brown, supra note 97, at 901.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 889-93.
Id. at 903.
Brown, supra note 97, at 894.
90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
Id. at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
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Also, because the unique physical characteristics
tion function."'
of female breasts bear "a direct relationship to the legislative purpose-the preservation of public decency and order," the ordinance
was not discriminatory.' °9 Significantly, in upholding the ordinance, the Washington Court required only a reasonable relationship to a legislative purpose rather than a compelling governmentalO
interest as endorsed by Brown. Further, in Marchioro v. Chaney,"
the Washington Supreme Court relied on the affirmative action language in Brown to uphold a statute requiring that the two members
of the State Democratic Committee be of the opposite sex. 1 1 ' The
Marchioro court said the statute was not discriminatory in that it did
not place burdens on one sex without placing similar burdens on
the other." 2 Finally, in MacLean v. First Northwest Industries l l3 the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that there was "no cognizable
discrimination" when a state-run sports complex held a "Ladies
Night."' 14
The Maryland courts failed to adopt an explicit standard to be
applied to sex-based classifications during the ERA's first five years
between 1972 and 1977. During this period, however, Maryland
courts upheld a conviction under a rape statute that applied only to
preference for mothers over
men"15 and approved a common-law
t6
fathers in custody battles."
In 1977, however, Maryland appeared to join the absolute scrutiny states when it held in Rand v. Rand"t7 that a common-law rule
making the father primarily responsible for his minor children was
irreconcilable with the ERA. 18 In that case Judge Murphy quoted
both the Washington and Pennsylvania courts with approval, and in
discussing the Maryland ERA he said that "[t]his language mandat108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
111. Id. at 308, 582 P.2d at 493. In Southwest Washington Chapter Nat'l Elec. Conractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 123-29, 667 P.2d 1092, 1100-03
(1983), the Washington Supreme Court also upheld a county's affirmative action hiring
plan.
112. 90 Wash. 2d at 306, 582 P.2d at 492.
113. 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
114. Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688.
115. Brooks v. Maryland, 24 Md. App. 334, 337-39, 330 A.2d 670, 672-73 (1975).
116. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 379, 319 A.2d 841, 843 (1974). The legislature responded to the Cooke decision with a statute which barred giving either parent a
preference because of their sex. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1974) (repealed 1984).
117. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
118. Id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905.
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ing equality of rightscan only mean that sex is not a factor."" 9
Some courts1 20 and commentators' 2 1 have concluded from the language of the Rand opinion that Maryland has joined those states
with an absolute standard.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

It was against this background that the Maryland Court of Appeals considered Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum. 122 Burning Tree is
a private golf club'which was established in 1922 on approximately
225 acres in Bethesda, Maryland. Burning Tree has never allowed
women to become members or enjoy guest privileges. 1 23 In 1965
the Maryland General Assembly enacted section 19(e) of article 81
which authorized the Maryland State Department of Assessments
and Taxation to offer private clubs deferment of their property
taxes in exchange for agreeing not to sell or develop their open
spaces.' 24 The 1965 Act did not mention discrimination.
In 1965 Burning Tree and the State entered into such an agreement for a period of ten years. The agreement was extended for
another ten years in 1975, and in 1981 Burning Tree entered into a
fifty-year agreement with the State.' 2 5 In 1974 the General Assembly amended section 19(e) to require that clubs receiving tax deferrals not discriminate in "granting membership or guest privileges
based upon the race, color, creed, sex, or national origin of any person or persons."'12 6 The amendment, however, qualified the prohibition on sex-based discrimination as follows:
The provisions of this section with respect to discrimination in sex shall not apply to any club whose facilities are
operated with the primary purpose, as determined by the
Attorney General, to serve or benefit members of a particular sex, nor to the clubs which exclude certain sexes only
119. Id. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903.
120. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp.394, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (1986) (holding
that state regulations restricting Medicaid payments for therapeutic abortions were unconstitutional); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 48, 506 A.2d 263,
267-68 (1986) (holding that a 50% discount for all patrons wearing a skirt or gown was
unconstitutional).
121. See, e.g., Avner, supra note 6, at 148-49; Comment, State Equal Rights Amendments:

Models for the Future, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 693, 699 n.37.
122. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
123. Id. at 58, 501 A.2d at 819.
124. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e) (1980).
125. 305 Md. at 59, 501 A.2d at 820.
126. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 870, 1974 Md. Laws 2913 (codified at
art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980)).

MD. ANN. CODE
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This is the "primary purpose" provision. 128 While approximately
twenty country clubs in Maryland receive open spaces tax deferrals,' 29 only Burning Tree benefited from the "primary purpose"
30
exception to the anti-discrimination language of section 19(e)(4).'
On August 12, 1983, Maryland State Senator Stewart Bainum,
Jr., as a taxpayer, and Barbara Renschler, as a taxpayer and as a
woman seeking membership in Burning Tree, filed suit against the
State, the Department of Assessments and Taxation, and Burning
Tree in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.' 3' The plaintiffs
asked for a declaration that the "primary purpose" provision violated Maryland's ERA, an order barring any further preferential tax
treatment for Burning Tree, and an order requiring Burning Tree
to accept membership applications from women. The circuit court
declared that although the "primary purpose" provision was facially
neutral, it violated the ERA because it discriminated against women.1 2 The court enjoined further preferential tax treatment for
Burning Tree,' 3 3 but declined to order Burning Tree to accept wo34
men as members.'
On appeal, a majority of the court of appeals agreed that the
"primary purpose" provision violated the ERA. 13 5 A different majority, however, reasoned that the provision was not severable from
36
the broader anti-sex discrimination language of the entire statute.1
The decision was complicated. In writing for three judges, Judge
Eldridge stated that the primary purpose language violated the
ERA1 37 and was severable from the broader anti-sex discrimination
language of the statute.' 3 8 Judge Murphy commanded three votes
for the view that the provision did not violate the ERA'3 9 and that if
it did, the offending language was not severable from the other anti127. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 870, 1974 Md. Laws 2913.
128. 305 Md. at 58, 501 A.2d at 819.
129. Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1985, at A-8, col. 3.
130. 305 Md. at 59, 501 A.2d at 820.
131. Id. at 59, 501 A.2d at 820. State Senator Bainum and Ms. Renschler are brother
and sister. Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1985, at A-I, col. 1.
132. 305 Md. at 61, 501 A.2d at 821.
133. Id. at 60, 501 A.2d at 820.
134. Id. at 61-62, 501 A.2d at 821.
135. Id. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832-33.
136. 305 Md. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832-33. Judge Eldridge said, in effect, that the court's
entire mandate in this case reflected the conclusions of one member only. Id. at 91 n.5.
137. Id. at 88, 501 A.2d at 835.
138. Id. at 102-05, 501 A.2d at 842-44.
139. Id. at 75-79, 501 A.2d at 828-30.
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sex discrimination language of the statute.' 40 Judge Rodowsky
4
wrote an opinion agreeing that the provision violated the ERA' '
but also agreeing that the language was not severable. 4 2 The effect
of the court's holding was to strike down in toto the General Assembly's amendment of section 19(e) prohibiting sex discrimination by
clubs receiving preferential tax treatment, thus allowing Burning
Tree to continue its discriminatory policies while retaining the tax
break.
Judge Murphy believed the ERA did not apply to this type of
statute. He said, "The cases construing equal rights amendments
share a common thread; they generally invalidate governmental ac' 4
tion which imposes a burden on one sex but not the other."' 3
Judge Murphy argued that because the statute on its face made the
tax benefit available to any eligible country club, whether, all-male or
all-female, "it does not apportion or distribute benefits or burdens
unequally among the sexes."1 4 4 Judge Murphy said that "[u]nder its
terms the primary purpose provision is sex-neutral because it operates without regard to gender."' 45
Acknowledging that a gender-neutral statute could be unconstitutional if it had a discriminatory purpose and effect, Judge Murphy
next considered whether the State, in passing section 19(e)(4) had
aided "Burning Tree in a way which makes its discriminatory policy
46
attributable to the State itself."',
After discussing the state action analysis propounded by the
Supreme Court in several recent equal protection cases, Judge Murphy concluded that "the doctrine plainly has no application in the
circumstances of this case."'' 4 7 Judge Murphy reasoned that since
the State neither initiated nor encouraged Burning Tree's single-sex
membership policy and since the Attorney General's role under the
statute was that of a mere "factfinder," the requisite state action was
not present.' 48 Judge Murphy distinguished this case from Norwood
v. Harrison.1 49 In Norwood, the Supreme Court held that a Mississippi law providing free textbooks to students in private schools
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

305 Md. at 84, 501 A,2d 832-33.
Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833.
Id. at 88, 501 A.2d at 835.
Id. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825.
305 Md. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 72, 501 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 75, 501 A.2d at 828.
305 Md. at 76, 501 A.2d at 829.
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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practicing racial discrimination involved state action in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. 5 ° Judge Murphy noted that Norwood
was not controlling authority for a state constitutional claim, and
that even if a fourteenth amendment claim was at issue in this case,
Norwood would not be applicable "since the Supreme Court applies
a more lenient standard of review to sex discrimination cases than to
race discrimination cases."'' Interestingly, Judge Murphy added:
The Supreme Court's analysis in Norwood is inapplicable to
cases that arise under the Maryland E.R.A. As our cases
clearly demonstrate, state action does not violate the
E.R.A. unless it has the effect of abridging or denying
"equality of rights under the law" on the basis of sex....
In contrast, Norwood indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not permit the State to aid discrimination even
when there is no precise causal relationship between the
state financial aid to a [racially discriminatory] private
school and the continued well-being of that school" . * * .
Thus although'a causal connection between the state action
and the discrimination is required under the Maryland
E.R.A., it was not required under Norwood's analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We
therefore find Norwood inap52
posite to the present case.'
Judge Rodowsky agreed with Judge Murphy that "the roles of
the Attorney General and of the State Department of Assessments
and Taxation under art. 81, sec. 19(e)" did not amount to state action.' 5"3 Judge Rodowsky added, however, that the General Assembly's inclusion of statutory language banning sex discrimination was
state action because "legislation is state action. "154 He went on to
conclude that the primary purpose provision cannot stand because
the "ERA... prevents the General Assembly from conferring lesser
benefits on persons who are objects of sex based discrimination"
than persons who are objects of other types of discrimination such
15 5
as race.
Seeing the ERA as clearly applicable in this case, Judge Eldridge rejected Judge Murphy's view that "the ERA is narrowly lim150. Id. at 463-65.
151. 305 Md. at 77, 501 A.2d at 829.
152. Id. at 78, 501 A.2d at 829.
153. Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833.
154. Id. at 86, 501 A.2d at 833-34. For the language included by the General Assembly, see Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 870, 1974 Md. Laws 2913 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980)).
155. 305 Md. at 88, 501 A.2d at 834.
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ited" to cases involving "government action directly imposing a
burden or conferring a benefit entirely upon either males or females." 1 56 Judge Eldridge agreed withJudge Rodowsky that section
57
19(e)(4) "on its face draws classifications based on gender.'I,
Judge Eldridge equated the "under the law" provision in the ERA
with the state action doctrine applicable to the fourteenth amendment. 158 He explained that the

principal classification implicating the ERA arises from the
language auth6rizing clubs, totally segregated on the basis
of sex, to maintain their discriminatory practices and, at the
same time, to continue receiving a significant state benefit.
On the other hand, sexually integrated country clubs are
generally precluded from discriminating on the basis of
1 59
sex.

Judge Eldridge concluded that in section 19(e)(4) "the General Assembly has expressly made classifications using sex as a factor."' 60
Unlike Judges Murphy and Rodowsky, Judge Eldridge found that
the "administrative machinery" set up by the statute so involved the
State in Burning Tree's discriminatory practices as to amount to
16
state action. 1
Having found state action present, and after noting cases from
a number of states interpreting their ERAs, Judge Eldridge determined that Maryland's "ERA makes sex classifications subject to at
least the same scrutiny as racial classifications."' 6 2 He noted, however, that
because of the inherent differences between the sexes,
some sex-based classifications may be justified after such
scrutiny whereas comparable race-based classifications
could not be sustained ....
Thus, separate restrooms or
locker room facilities for blacks and whites cannot be tolerated, but such separate facilities for men and women can be
63
justified by the state.
The 1985 Burning Tree decision has not completely clarified how
the ERA will be applied to these kinds of cases in Maryland. This is
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838.
Id. at 99, 501 A.2d at 840.
Id. at 90 n.3, 501 A.2d at 836 n.3.
305 Md. at 90 n.3, 501 A.2d at 836 n.3.
Id. at 98-99, 501 A.2d at 840.
Id. at 92-93, 501 A.2d at 837.
Id. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840.
305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840.
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evident from the legislative and judicial events since Burning Tree.
On April 4, 1986, the Maryland General Assembly amended section
8-214 of the Tax-Property Article to eliminate Burning Tree's preferential tax assessment. 16 4 The amendment reinstated the prohibition of sex discrimination without any "primary purpose" provision.
In rewriting the law, however, the legislature continued to permit
periodic discrimination; that is, country clubs still were allowed to
exclude or admit men or women on certain days or at certain times
and have practices such as separate tee-off times for men and
65
women. 1
On July 1, 1986, Burning Tree filed suit in Anne Arundel
County Circuit Court claiming that the new law breached the contract the State had signed with Burning Tree. 66 Burning Tree
asked that the law not be enforced until the contract expires. In a
display of "chutzpah," Burning Tree also claimed that the new law
violated Maryland's ERA by permitting clubs to engage in "periodic
discrimination."' 6 7 On July 21, 1987, the Anne Arundel County
Circuit Court struck down the new statute as violative of the ERA.'6 8
The circuit court opinion noted that although Judge Eldridge's
opinion in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum 6' 9 declined to resolve the
periodic discrimination issue, 170 Judge Rodowsky's opinion specifically said that periodic discrimination was unconstitutional.' 7 ' The
circuit court recognized that although Judge Eldridge applied a
strict scrutiny standard rather than an absolute standard in Burning
Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum,'71 it did not "believe judge Eldridge's opin164. MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-214 (Supp. 1987), as amendid by Act of May 13,
1986, 1986 Md. Laws 1317.
165. Id.
166. Wash. Post, July 2, 1986, at B-7, col. 5.
167. Id. An affidavit filed in the case by Stephen Clarkson, a member of Burning
Tree's Board of Governors, listed 11 Maryland country clubs with open spaces contracts
that practiced periodic discrimination. Affidavit of Stephen Clarkson, Burning Tree v.
Maryland, No. 310-8902, slip op. (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. July 21, 1987).
168. Burning Tree v. Maryland, No. 310-8902, slip op. (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct.
July 21, 1987).
169. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
170. No. 310-8902, slip op. at 31 (citing Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 90 n.1, 501 A.2d at
520 n.1).
171. Id. at 39 (citing 305 Md. at 87, 501 A.2d at 834).
172. Id. at 37. See also Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 506 A.2d
263 (1986). Peppin is the only Maryland appellate case involving the ERA since the 1985
Burning Tree decision. The Peppin Court of Special Appeals, citing Burning Tree, 305 Md.
53, 501 A.2d 817, said that the ERA "prescribes an 'absolute standard' and not a balancing test. Therefore, once discrimination is proved, a court cannot consider arguments
attempting to 'balance' the discriminatory practice against other concerns." 67 Md.
App. at 46-47, 506 A.2d at 267.
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7
ion overturned Rand."T'
Therefore, the circuit court did not apply
a strict scrutiny analysis in its determination of the constitutionality
74
of the amendment to section 8-214 of the Tax-Property Article.'
The court applied an absolute standard of review and said "the
only acceptable reason for treating the sexes differently, under the
ERA, is for physical reasons peculiar to one sex."' l7 The court
struck down the periodic discrimination clause for violating the ERA
by applying the absolute standard, but noted that the law would
have failed even under strict scrutiny because the State had made no
76
effort to justify the classification.'

III.

ANALYSIS

This note is in substantial agreement with the Maryland Court
of Appeals' decision in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum 1 77-that
there was state action and that the "primary purpose" language violated the ERA in that case. The decision, however, can be criticized
for failing to clarify what standard is to be applied to sex-based classifications under the Maryland ERA. Although the court effectively
applied strict scrutiny for sex-based classification, the court was far
from explicit on this point. Burning Tree also can be criticized for
failing to craft a state action requirement for the Maryland ERA
which is independent of the state action standard developed in the
federal courts for equal protection analysis.
A.

State Action

Although Judges Murphy and Eldridge reached different conclusions about the presence of state action in Burning Tree, they both
assumed without much discussion that the Maryland ERA is applicable only against state action. Judge Eldridge stated:
The parties, the other opinions in this case, and decisions
under other state constitutional E.R.A. provisions, equate
the "under the law" provision in the E.R.A. with the "state
action" doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. I
173. No. 310-8902, slip op. at 37. For a discussion of Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374
A.2d 900 (1977), see supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
174. No. 310-8902, slip op. at 37.
175. Id. at 35 (citing Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 64 n.3, 501 A.2d at 822 n.3).
176. Id. at 37. The State argued that Burning Tree lacked standing to challenge the
law. Significantly, the court relied on Burning Tree, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817, to find
that the language of the periodic discrimination provision was not severable from the
broader anti-sex discrimination language of the statute. No. 310-8902, slip op. at 37.
177. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
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agree that the two concepts are essentially the same."'
A debate has raged between commentators who urge the courts
to dispense with the "state action" doctrine entirely and commentators who urge the courts to retain it. The opponents of the state
action doctrine argue that the doctrine is based on an "anachronistic premise" about the extent to which the common law protects
7 9
individuals from "infringements of their rights by private actors."'
Proponents of state action make a number of arguments: that a
state action requirementis 'inherent in any constitutional provision;
that state. action requirements protect a zone of personal autonomy
and help preserve state autonomy; and that "constitutionalizing private law" would hamper legislative and common-law responses to
social issues and would produce disrespect for the constitution.' 80
While the court in Burning Tree did not discuss the merits of these
various claims, its decision to impose a state action requirement was
a wise one.
Those who argue for the elimination of the state action requirement are correct in observing that the standards employed in the
federal courts appear confusing and inconsistent, shifting as they
have from broadly applying the state action doctrine' 8 ' to narrowly
applying it.i 8 2 Moreover, some of the arguments for requiring state
action are unpersuasive. The view that a state action requirement is
inherent in any constitution, 8 . for example, is unconvincing since
some federal 8 4 and state1 8 5 constitutional provisions are applicable
to private as well as governmental interests. Similarly, the desire to
preserve a sphere of state autonomy may be a valid reason for preserving state action in the federal constitutional context, but it is
irrelevant in the context of a state's construction of its own
constitution.
178. Id. at 90 n.3, 501 A.2d at 836 n.3.
179. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 506. See aso supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
181. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
182. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
183. Dolliver, supra note 48, at 447 (suggesting that "state action" is a "fundamental
premise of a bill of rights").
184. The thirteenth amendment does not require state action: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1.
185. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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There are, however, two important reasons for requiring state
action under the Maryland ERA. First, the language of the amendment tends to indicate an intention to require state action. Second,
the state action requirement may be necessary to preserve the individual's freedom of association.
While the "under the law" language of Maryland's ERA does
not clearly limit the ERA to state action, that is the most plausible
reading of the words. As noted above, the Maryland courts have
generally followed the federal approach to the state action requirement1 86 and the Maryland Attorney General is of the view that the
language of the ERA proscribes only state action. 8 7 There is no
legislative history of the Maryland ERA to indicate the intent of the
legislature that passed it.' 88 Moreover, contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the ERA offers little assistance.' 8 9 In
April 1974 the Governor's Commission to Study Implementation of
the Equal Rights Amendment (Commission) "compiled a list of all
possible areas of the law, both statutory and non-statutory which
might be affected by the ERA."' 9 0 In doing so, the Commission
looked at statutes, case law, state-regulated activity, and "[a]ny
other laws or state action which could arguably be the subject of a
court challenge under the ERA."'' This is, admittedly, scant evidence from which to infer a state action requirement.
The more persuasive reason for applying the ERA solely to
state action is to preserve a sphere of personal autonomy. While it
is not clear that "constitutionalizing private wrongs" will breed disrespect for the constitution, it does seem reasonable that in a pluralistic society which values individual freedom, private individuals
should be free to associate with whomever they please. Thus, if individuals want to organize themselves into groups open only to
other people like themselves, society should tolerate such an organi186. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 75 and accompanying text."
188. This lack of any indication of the intentions of those involved in passing the ERA
is not confined to Maryland. Apparently neither Pennsylvania nor Massachusetts offers
much in the way of a legislative history of their ERAs. Because all three states' ERAs
were debated and passed at the same time the federal ERA was under consideration,
many assumed that the state ERAs were simply miniature versions of the federal proposal. But the language of several ERAs, including Maryland's, differ significantly from the
federal ERA in the absence of any explicit state action requirement. See Heins, supra
note 57, at 370.
189. Id. at 370.
190. Report of the Governor's Commission to Study Implementation of the Equal
Rights Amendment 3 (July 1, 1978).
191. Id.
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zation. While there are areas of private life where an individual's
freedom to associate should be curtailed for the public good (i.e.,
employment, housing, public accommodations), these areas should
be delineated legislatively rather than through the broad brush of a
constitutional amendment.
Indeed, the freedom to associate is not merely benevolent public policy; it is a federal constitutional right.' 9 2 Dispensing with a
state action requirement or even defining state action too broadly
could conflict with this right. The Supreme Court discussed the
protection afforded freedom of association in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees.' 9 3 Roberts involved the Jaycees' challenge to a Minnesota
Human Rights Commission order requiring that they admit women. 9 4 The Jaycees' policy had been to restrict its basic membership to men under the age of thirty-five. 9 5 In Roberts, the Court
distinguished two types of freedom of association: (1) freedom of
intimate association and (2) freedom of expressive association. The
first type involves personal affiliations, with the greatest protection
given to familial relationships. The second protects associations
formed for the expression of political or religious ideas. 9 6
In determining the amount of protection afforded to a particular intimate association, the Roberts Court indicated that "size, purpose, policies, selectivity, [and] congeniality" are the relevant
factors.' 9 7 In Roberts, the Court concluded that the Jaycees had a
very large membership, were indiscriminate in their admissions policies with the exception of their sex and age restrictions, and allowed nonmembers to participate in their activities.' 9 ' Therefore,
the Court concluded the "Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision
of its members to exclude women." 1 99
Since it is relatively small and quite exclusive, a club such as
Burning Tree might succeed where the Jaycees failed. Thus, legal
192. The freedom of expressive association is a right protected by the first amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I.
193. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
194. Id. at 616.
195. Id. at 613.
196. Id. at 617-18. Presumably, Burning Tree would fall into the first category.
197. 468 U.S. at 620.
198. Id. at 621.
199. Id. The Court also held that the Jaycees' freedom of expressive association had
not been infringed. Id. at 628-29.
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attacks on truly private but discriminatory clubs might fail on freedom of association grounds.
In order to protect an individual's freedom of association, the
Maryland ERA should be applicable only against state action. This
does not mean, however, that Maryland should embrace the narrow
view of state action currently espoused by the Supreme Court in
equal protection cases.2 °0 Yet, in Burning Tree, after having agreed
that Maryland's ERA applies only to state action, Judges Murphy
and Eldridge both turned to federal equal protection analysis to define the scope of state action.2 0 '
Judge Murphy's state action analysis rested entirely on the
Supreme Court's current approach to state action under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.20 2 These recent
Supreme Court cases have found state action only where there is
evidence of state intention to advance or approve a discriminatory
policy. 203 Using this approach, Judge Murphy concluded that there
was no state action present in this case. 20 4 Even under current federal equal protection analysis, however, it is arguable that state action was present in this case. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 2 05 for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board's requirement that a club abide by its discriminatory bylaws
or lose its liquor license amounted to unconstitutional state ac*201
tion.
While
h
Maryland did not require Burning Tree to continue
discriminating against women or lose its tax break, it did say that if a
club abandoned its policy of serving only men, it would become subject to an additional legal restriction, namely the anti-sex discrimination language of the statute. 20 7 Thus, as in Moose Lodge, the
Maryland statute served as a disincentive for clubs to stop discriminating. A club that chose to stop discriminating would assume additional legal restrictions, whereas a club that continued to
discriminate on the basis of sex would be subject to fewer legal
restrictions.
Judge Eldridge's opinion distinguished the more recent
Supreme Court state action cases and looked to an older Fourth Cir200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-152 & 158-161 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
305 Md. at 75-76, 501 A.2d at 828-29.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Id. at 178-79.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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cuit case, Simkins v. Moses Cone Memorial Hospital.20° Simkins held unconstitutional a federal statute under which federal funds were
granted to private hospitals for building and operational expenses. 2 0 9 The federal statute prohibited recipients from discriminating on the basis of race, but as in Burning Tree, the statute created
an exception."
In Simkins, hospitals that discriminated could receive the funds if they provided separate, but equal, facilities for
"separate population groups." '' The Simkins court held that the
"degree of state participatilon and involvement" in the discriminatory aspects of the program were sufficient to find state action
212
present.
The Simkins case was decided in 1963 when Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority2 3 was the reigning Supreme Court state action
case. As discussed above, the definition of state action in the federal
courts has neither been clear nor consistent. Borrowing such an
ambiguous standard to apply to a provision of the Maryland Constitution serves no useful purpose since it confuses application of the
ERA for trial judges, attorneys, and the general public in Maryland.
In the face of the chaotic federal concept of state action, Maryland
courts should embrace the spirit of federalism and "serve as a laboratory, ' ' 2 1 4 creating and experimenting with its own state action
standard.
As noted above, one of the rationales for the federal court's
view of state action is that in the interest of federalism a sphere of
power should be left in the hands of state courts and legislatures.21 5
Hence, for the.Maryland courts to borrow a state action standard
which has been constructed narrowly, partly out of deference to the
state courts, is to swallow one's own tail. Therefore, the Maryland
courts should develop an independent state action doctrine as other
state courts have done in the area of freedom of speech because it
would significantly advance the salutary goals of federalism. Moreover, since the federal constitution does not contain an ERA provi208. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
209. Id. at 969.
210. Id. at 964.
211. Id.
212. 323 F.2d at 967.
213. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
214. Justice Brandeis once noted that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See supra note 43.
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sion, Maryland should not apply its ERA through a confused state
action standard borrowed from federal equal protection analysis.
While the Maryland court has perhaps inextricably entwined its
standard for state action under article 24 with the state action standard for the fourteenth amendment, 21 6 it has not yet done so irrevocably with the ERA. Since equal protection and ERA provisions
were enacted at different times to meet different needs, it would be
appropriate to have different state action standards for different
constitutional provisions.
In delineating the scope of the state action requirement under
the ERA, the court should balance two compelling societal interests:
the interest in ensuring equal rights for men and women and the
interest that citizens in a democratic society enjoy a sphere of personal freedom concerning with whom they associate. While any
state action formula is necessarily vague since the determination
hinges on the specific facts of each case, it is possible to identify the
various activities that should be considered state action for purposes
of the ERA. Once the State crosses the line from tolerating private
discrimination to promoting it, state action should come into play.
Professor Charles Black has articulated a similar principle in the
context of racial discrimination:
This formula would concede . .. that state "neutrality" is
barely possible and that neutrality where attained isolates
the racial discrimination from state power. But it would
qualify this neutrality obligation as one ... calling for the
most scrupulous abstention by the state from any special
contact or connection with the discriminatory practice
other than the merest failure to make it unlawful . . . . I
cannot think why the litmus paper that tests for the corrosive acid of state-supported
racism should be any less sensi21 7
this.
than
tive
A definition of state action so broad that it would make the
existence of organizations such as Burning Tree impossible should
be rejected. Thus a state action definition flowing from Shelley v.
Kraemer,21 s which would make any access to judicial process by such
organizations state action, should be rejected. On the other hand,
where the government provides financial or other assistance to an
organization, or where the state awards coveted licenses or benefits,
the recipients should be deemed state actors.
216. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
217. Black, supra note 44, at 99-100.
218. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Level of Scrutiny

In Burning Tree, Judge Murphy, whose opinion in Rand v.
Rand 21 9 seemed to announce Maryland's entry into the absolute
scrutiny camp, took the view that Maryland's ERA is only implicated
2 20
where different burdens or benefits are imposed based on sex.
This view of the ERA would appear to suggest that separate-butequal facilities for men and women would be acceptable. Judge
Murphy said that
[w]e need not here give detailed consideration to whether
state action in providing "separate but equal" facilities for
men and women violates the ERA. Conceivably, a law requiring separation of the sexes might be subject to chalsex
lenge on the ground that unconstitutional
discrimination resulted therefrom because of inherent ineone sex or the other in the separaquality of treatment2 2 for
1
tion process itself.

219. 285 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
220. 305 Md. 53, 70, 501 A.2d 817, 825 (1985).
221. Id. at 79, 501 A.2d at 830. Judge Murphy said that in Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.
2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court, in its decision adopting
the absolute standard, suggested that separate but equal athletic teams in public schools
for males and females would not violate the state's ERA. 305 Md. at 67, 501 A.2d at
823. This is questionable. The court in Damn cited with approval a decision by a Pennsylvania court (Pennsylvania being the only other state to apply an absolute standard)
which held that qualified girls could play on a boys' football team regardless of whether
there was a girls' team. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,
18 Pa. Commw. 45, 53, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (1975). The Washington Supreme Court
quoted Pennsylvania InterscholasticAthletic Ass 'n:
Even where separate teams are offered for boys and girls in the same sport, the
most talented girls still may be denied the right to play at that level of competition which their ability might otherwise permit them. For a girl in that position
who has been relegated to the 'girls' team' solely because of her sex, 'equality
under the law' has been denied.
85 Wash. 2d at 873, 540 P.2d at 890 (quoting Pennsylvania InterscholasticAthletic Ass'n, 18
Pa. Commw. at 52, 334 A.2d at 842).
The Darin court concluded its opinion by agreeing with the Pennsylvania court's
rationale
that under our ERA discrimination on account of sex is forbidden. The... rule
forbidding qualified girls from playing on the high school football team in interscholastic competition cannot be used to deny the Darrin girls, and girls like
them, the right to participate as members of that team. This is all the more so
when the school provides no corresponding girls' football team on which girls
may participate as players.
85 Wash. 2d at 877-78, 540 P.2d at 893.
This last sentence is the only indication that separate football teams for girls would
be acceptable to the Damn court. While it is a tantalizing sentence, looked at in context
it appears only to offer another reason for the holding, not to signal a possible
exception.
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It is not merely conceivable, but indubitable, that the ERA reflects the legislative judgment that such separation is inherently unequal and thus forbidden. Therefore, Judge Murphy appears to
advocate an ERA standard that provides less protection than strict
scrutiny. Judge Murphy's view on this point illustrates a major flaw
in the absolute standard approach. The "absolute standard," given
all its exceptions, is a misnomer. For no other reason than accuracy,
it should not be called the "absolute standard."
By permitting as many exceptions as it does, the absolute standard ironically has the potential for becoming something much
weaker than the strict scrutiny standard. Brown makes it plain that
the "subsidiary principle" is a narrow exception to the absolute
standard designed to permit such things as laws related to
childbearing and forcible rape and regulating wet nurses and sperm
donors.2 2 2 Yet, this "subsidiary principle" appears to contain the
seeds of destruction for the larger principle by opening the gates to
all sorts of laws justified by, for instance, a woman's unique capacity
for bearing children. Such an exception could reduce the standard
from absolute to something less than strict scrutiny. Any classification based on sex ultimately takes into account "physical characteristics unique to one sex." 2 2 3 Brown acknowledges that this
"subsidiary principle" could be used as a subterfuge for laws discriminating against one sex, and urges courts to apply strict scrutiny
2 24
to laws dealing with physical characteristics unique to one sex.
But in Seattle v. Buchanan,2 2 5 where the Washington Supreme Court
used this exception to uphold an ordinance prohibiting the exposure of female breasts in public, the court required only a reasonable relationship to a legislative purpose, rather than a compelling
governmental interest as required by the strict scrutiny approach
suggested by Brown.2 2 6
Brown argued that strict scrutiny allows for too much discretion. But the experience of the Washington courts and Judge Murphy's opinion in Burning Tree illustrate that even under an absolute
standard there is room for a great deal of judicial discretion. Such
discretion may allow classifications to survive under an absolute
standard that would not survive strict scrutiny. Discriminatory laws
should not be permitted to circumvent the ERA by being deemed
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Brown, supra note 97 & notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
See Brown, supra note 97, at 893.
Id. at 894.
90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
Id. at 591. 584 P.2d at 921.
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exceptions or by being considered classifications to which the ERA
is inapplicable. Such laws should be accommodated only by demonstrating a compelling state interest as required by strict scrutiny.
The absolute approach also is unnecessary. The strict scrutiny
standard has served societal interests well when racial discrimination has been challenged because few classifications have survived
that level of scrutiny.2 2 7 The Washington state courts applied strict
scrutiny to sex-based classifications prior to the passage of its ERA,
and to give effect to the ERA, perhaps they had to impose an even
higher standard of scrutiny. Maryland does not have that problem
since it did not apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications prior
to the passage of the State ERA.
Judge Eldridge's opinion in Burning Tree reflects a strict scrutiny
approach to sex-based classifications:
Consequently, the E.R.A. renders sex-based classifications
suspect and subject to at least strict scrutiny, with the burden of persuasion being upon those attempting to justify
the classifications. In this respect, the E.R.A. makes sex
classifications subject to at least the same scrutiny as racial
classifications. Of course, because of the inherent differences between the sexes some sex-based classifications may
be justified after such scrutiny, whereas comparable racebased classifications could not be sustained . . . . Thus,
separate restroom or locker room facilities for blacks and
whites cannot be tolerated but such separate facilities for
men and women can be justified by the state. 22 8
This language indicates that, in Judge Eldridge's view, sexbased classifications can be justified, but that the State bears a heavy
burden when it tries to do so. Since Judge Eldridge's opinion embraces strict scrutiny and Judge Murphy's suggests that the absolute
standard is in some ways less strict than strict scrutiny, this note
concludes that, at most, sex-based classifications challenged under
the ERA in Maryland are subject to strict scrutiny. The strict scrutiny standard, although borrowed from federal equal protection
analysis, is an appropriate standard for Maryland because it is coherent, well understood, and fulfills the mandate of the ERA.

227. "Apparently the only instance in which 'the state has met the burden of showing
a compelling state interest' justifying a racial classification in a case before the Supreme
Court was in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)." Gokel, One Small Word:
Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 948, 948 n.2 (1978).
228. 305 Md. 53, 98, 501 A.2d 817, 840 (1985).
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CONCLUSION

In our federal system, when a state court interprets its state
constitution, it should neither pointlessly diverge nor slavishly adhere to federal tests and standards applied to similar federal constitutional provisions. In the case of the Maryland ERA, the Maryland
courts should borrow the strict scrutiny standard from federal equal
protection analysis, but should create their own state action standard. Strict scrutiny is a well-understood and readily applied concept which aids implementation of the sweeping mandate of the
ERA. It is preferable to the absolute standard which, although well
intentioned, is rife with exceptions that undercut its effectiveness.
While the ERA requires some state action standard, the purposes of
the ERA will be ill-served by borrowing the chaotic and narrow federal model. Instead, Maryland should formulate its own state action
standard--one narrow enough so as not to conflict with individual
freedom of association, but broad enough to give the ERA maximum effect.
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